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Respondents respectfully petition this Court for a rehearing in the above
cause upon this issue:
This Court erred in ruling the Dussaults not liable for losses
caused to the Trust Estate by their actions as Trustees.
WHEREFORE, petitioners ask for a rehearing in this cause, that the issue
be reconsidered and for affirmance of the Trial Court T s ruling and judgment.
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BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
NATURE OF THE CASE
This suit was brought by beneficiaries of the Marie Dorothy Wattis Trust
against the defendants, Trustees of the Marie Dorothy Wattis T r u s t , claiming
damage for mismanagment of the Trust estate.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondents, after a four day trial before the court sitting without a
j u r y , were granted judgment against appellants John Dussault and Dorothy Dussault
for the sum of $143,526.03; and judgment against Donald Bowman in the sum of
$11,318.91.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants John Dussault and Dorothy Dussault seek reversal of the judgment entered against them, Respondents seek affirmance.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts set out in Respondents original brief is referred to
and will not be here repeated. We do call the following matters to the Court T s
attention, these matters being set out in the Court's majority opinion, as Statements
of Fact:
1. "No complaint was made of this practice when the trust estate was being
increased, but when the stock market went down and the loss occurred,
the plaintiffs sued."
The record was clear, and the court so found, that during the period
of improper activities, no accountings were made by defendants to
- 4 - J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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anyone (Finding No. 7, R-193) . The record is also clear that
during the period when gains were experienced, no accountings of
any kind ever went to these beneficiaries. They were not consulted
or informed in any way of the transactions, and had no opportunity
to complain until the facts were learned. (R-1,7). This was after
the death of Mrs. Bowman, long after the damage had been done, and
long after repeated requests for accountings had been refused or
ignored by these defendants.

(Ex. I, Ex. T ) .

2. "As to the remaining part of the judgment, one must look to the language
of the trust instrument to see if the Dussaults can be held for a diminution of the trust assets by reason of buying on margin and by dealing
in speculative stocks. TT
This statement correctly sets forth two of the grounds (margin and
speculation) but ignores two others shown without dispute in the
evidence and found by the Trial Court, namely, complete lack of
diversification and complete lack of considering the interests of
the other beneficiaries (Respondents T Brief page 27, Findings 7,9,
(R 193, 194).
3.

TT

.. .they cannot be held responsible for losses due to a falling stock
market."

The losses here were due solely to the improper actions of defendants,
and not to a falling stock market. The evidence as to market conditions,
during this period when the losses were incurred was as follows
(Tr 355-6):
Q

During the period from 1968 through 1970, this particular trust
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indicates, Mr. Jevens?
A

Yes, sir; it does.

Q

Could you tell the Court what the general market overall was during

those years?
A

1968 through 1970.

Q

Yes. 1968 through 1970.

A

1968 was basically a year of rising prices in the stock market. 1969

was a year of declining prices. The market actually picked u p , as I r e call, in the late fall of 1968 or early 1969, based on most averages. 1970
was a continuation of that decline up until May or June of that year at
which time the market did turn around abruptly and rose substantially
from the middle of 1970 to the end of that y e a r . So that if you look at
the example of Dow Jones average for 1970 it still showed, I think, up
two percent as I recall and yet there were many stocks that went through
a 24 or 30 percent price change during that y e a r .
Q

Would there be anything in the overall picture of the market during

those years that would have resulted in a general loss to trust investments as such during that period of time?
A

Taking the three years?

Q

Yes.

A

There are some measures of t h i s , I have a report with me, but

basically, from the beginning of 1968 to the end of 1970 I think most
accounts would have shown a marked improvement in overall value.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Q

By most accounts, would we be talking about an account that was

managed in accordance with the prudent man rule and verification rule?
A

Yes.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE

A TRUSTEE'S DUTIES ARE NOT CO-EXTENSIVE WITH
HIS POWERS UNDER THE TRUST INSTRUMENT.
Although the precise basis for the majority opinion is not clear to u s , it
seems to hold
1) The Trust instrument prevails over the statute;
2) Under the Trust instrument the Trustees had the power to purchase
speculative stocks;
3) Since they only did what they were authorized to do, they cannot be
held liable.
The result of this holding can be calamitous for unsuspecting trustors and beneficiaries . For instance, a Trustee has the power to invest Trust funds in real
estate. He invests the entire corpus, sight unseen, in Bolivian swamp land.
The Trustee in doing so had no ulterior motive, realized no private gain, yet in
one act destroyed the T r u s t . As we read the current decision, he would have
no liability.
We submit this Court has erroneously equated power with duty. It is
universally held that even though the Trustee be vested with broad, even uncontrolled and absolute discretions and powers, he still must act in a reasonably prudent manner to effect the purpose of the T r u s t .
78 ALR 2nd 41: "Frequently a will or other trust instrument gives the
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
trusteeDigitized
a discretion
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invest. Nevertheless, it is well settled that the law imposes certain
duties and obligations upon a trustee who has a general discretion as
to investments, the result of which is to make many types of investments improper even under a power to invest in nonlegals.
A trustee who is given a discretion to invest in nonlegals does not
have an arbitrary and unlimited discretion as to the investments he will
make."
78 ALR 2nd 42: "The granting of a discretion to invest in nonlegals does
not affect the application of the general rule that a trustee, in making
investments, must exercise the proper degree of c a r e , prudence, diligence,
and caution."
78 ALR 2nd 42: "The grant of authority to invest in nonlegals does not
authorize a trustee to use any less care and caution in the selection of
investments, but merely gives him a wider field in which to exercise
due care and caution. Re Jeffress* Will (1950) 198 Misc 249, 97 NYS 2nd
132: Re Free T s Will (1956) 4 Misc 2nd 463, 148 NYS 2nd 884; Re
Berthet T s Estate (1959) 22 Misc 2nd 7, 196 NYS 2nd 354."
78 ALR 2nd 44: "There is a serious question whether a trust instrument
which purports to give a trustee an "absolute and uncontrolled discretion"
as to investments will give the trustee any broader authority than an
instrument which gives him a "general discretion" as to investments."
Alexander v Hicks, Ky 1972, 488 SW2 336: "However, a discretion
which, though purportedly unlimited in other respects, can be exercised
only for the benefit of other persons does not in itself invalidate a trust.
54 Am Jur 48 (Trusts, §36). Not only is the T r u s t e e d power limited
with respect to the purposes and beneficiaries of the t r u s t , it is limited
also by the duties imposed on all Trustees, such as good faith, diligence,
and the like."
Judge v Kortenhaus, N . J . 1963, 192 A2 320: "Professor Scott in his
notable work on trusts sets forth the general rule applicable to discretionary
powers conferred upon Trustees as follows:
"To the extent to which the Trustee has discretion, the court will
not control his exercise of it so long as he does not exceed the limits
of the discretion conferred upon him. The court will not substitute its
own judgment for h i s . Even where the trustee has discretion, however,
the court will not permit him to abuse the discretion. This ordinarily
means that as long as he acts not only in good faith and from proper
motives, but also within the bounds of a reasonable judgment, the court
will not interfere; but the court will interfere when he acts outside the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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bounds of a reasonable judgment.. ." 2 Scott on T r u s t s , (2nd Ed. 1956),
§187, p . 1374."
In Re Estate of Becker, Wis. 1972, 202NW2 681: "In this case the respondents seek the appellants removal as Trustees and an accounting therein for
damages sustained to the Trust because of appellants T said actions. The
basis for this action rests on the rule that a Trustee still has a strict duty
of loyalty to the trust even though the will or trust instrument gives the
Trustee broad power of discretion. These powers must still be exercised
according to the law and consistent with the duties and obligations as a
trustee of the T r u s t . "
Briggs v Crowley, Mass. 1967, 224NE2 417: "It is well established that
"even very broad discretionary powers are to be exercised in accordance
with fiduciary standards and with reasonable regard for usual fiduciary
principles." Old Colony Trust Co. v . Silliman, Mass, 223NE2 504. In
Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v . Stone, 348 Mass 345, 351, fn. 8,
203 NE2 547, 552, we stated that "A fair reading of the whole of most
trust instruments will reveal a judicially enforceable, external, and
ascertainable standard for the exercise of even broadly expressed fiduciary
powers. See United States v Powell, 307 F2 821, 826, (10th C i r ) . " In
the instant case the trust instrument itself contains a clear expression
of the applicable standard for the exercise of the trustees 1 discretion.
"The principal purpose of this trust is to provide for the necessaries
and comfort of the persons named herein and in order to accomplish
this purpose it is intended to give said Trustees the fullest authority
and discretion." (emphasis supplied). The essence of the petitioners
petition is that the respondents have not exercised their discretion in
accordance with this standard." (decree sustaining demurrer to petition
reversed)
Dombey v Rindfoos, Ohio 1958, 151NE2 563: "The actions of fiduciaries
of a trust estate will not be upheld in a course palpably arbitrary and
unreasonable. "It is not sufficient that he be honest, and from a strictly
moral standpoint act in good faith. He is bound in law to exercise diligence
and to act reasonably." Kroeller v Poland, 80 Ohio St. 418, 89 NE 100,
Morris v Mull, 110 Ohio St. 623, 634, 635, 144 NE 436, 39ALR323,
Restatement of T r u s t s , 431, Section 170.
It is our view that the seemingly unlimited discretion contended
for by the language authorizing the trustees to act as if one were "absolute
owners of the Trust Estate" and to exercise "privileges and discretions"
which the testator would exercise if present, cannot mean more than that
the decedent intended that the fiduciaries would act reasonably, as
required by law, and for the best interest of the trust estate.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Fiduciaries will not be excused on the ground that the instrument creating
the trust and making them Trustees has given them broad authority
and unlimited discretion in the administration of the Trust.
The Trustee cannot take advantage of liberal provisions of a Trust
instrument to relieve him from the legal responsibility of a fiduciary
under the law."
Davis v Duke University, NC 1973, 194SE2 761: "The extent of the discretion
lodged in Trustees by settlors may be enlarged by the use of adjectives
or phrases such as "absolute" or "uncontrolled". Even the use of such
strong terms does not grant unlimited discretion. The real question is
whether it appears that the trustees are exercising their discretionary
powers in the manner in which the settlor contemplated they should act."
This "powers and duties" concept is clearly shown in Title 33 of our Code,
Investments by Fiduciaries. 3 3 - 2 - 1 . U.C.A. 1953, is one paragraph, consisting
of two sentences. The first sentence outlines the duties of a fiduciary, i . e . , the
"prudent man" r u l e . The second sentence specifies acceptable properties and
investments, within the limitations of the foregoing standard (prudent man).
33-2-2, U.C .A. 1953, apparently is relied upon in our case to find that the
trust instrument itself is paramount over the statute, and does away with the prudent
man r u l e . There are two problems with this- first, the statute provides
a minimum standard of conduct. T h u s , a Trustee under strict limitations of power
in the Trust instrument could not rely upon the statute to provide those powers
(although the court could do so under 33-2-3) . Secondly, the Marie Dorothy
Wattis Trust nowhere purports to define the duties of the Trustee as other than
duties the law imposes. It does grant broad discretionary powers- just as in the
cited cases- but never does it state the Trustees will not be required to act as
Trustees.
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The express purpose of the Trust (R-3) is:
. . , "for the purposes of management of her property and estate
with greater personal ease and freedom during her lifetime and
conservation of the same for final distribution after her death.. ."
Article VIII, relied upon in the Court T s decision as determinative of his
case, begins (R-7):
TT

To carry out the express purposes of this t r u s t , and in aid of its
proper execution and the administration, management, and disposition
of the trust estate, the Trustees are vested with the following powers
and discretions: " (emphasis added)
POINT TWO
THE TRUST INSTRUMENT DID NOT ABSOLVE THE DEFENDANTS FROM
LIABILITY.
The majority opinion seized upon a few words in the powers and duties
Article of the trust to in effect hold the defendants could not be held liable for
losses.
(a) Exculpatory provisions are always strictly construed, see dissent
of Justice Maughan, Restatement of T r u s t s , Second, §222.
(b) The language of Article VIII does not, unless taken out of context,
insulate the Trustees from liability. The language relied on by the
majority opinion protects third persons dealing with the trust in good
faith, and protects the Trustees from liability (for instance, assessments
or stolen stock certificates) arising from ownership of securities.
(c) Notwithstanding any provision of a trust instrument attempting to
relieve the trustee from liability for breach of t r u s t , he is liable for
breaches of trust committed in bad faith, intentional breaches, and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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breaches committed with reckless indifference to the rights of the
beneficiaries. Restatement of Trusts Second, §222 (2). Such a
provision would be contrary to public policy and void.
(d) The Trial Court findings cited and not reversed by the opinion
of this court, included,
1) Dussaults managed the trust for their own benefit, with no regard
to other beneficiaries and made no accountings;
2) They were guilty of gross inattentiveness, equivalent of bad faith;
3) During this time Dussault was a knowledgeable investor, and
knew he was not allowed to manage a trust this way, yet did it anyway
because it was in his own best interest;
4) Speculated to a high degree with trust funds, improperly
investing the funds in speculative stocks, without diversifying
and compounded his faults by extensive use of margins.
CONCLUSION
While he may, under different trust instruments, have different standards
to adhere to, we come to the basic question that a man is either a trustee or he is not.
If he i s , he must act as such. If he does not have these fiduciary duties and
loyalties, he may be a bailee, an agent, or some other entity, but certainly he is
not a trustee. This concept is reflected in Rippey v Denver United States National
Bank, 273 F . Supp. 718, Colo 1967:

-12-
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"The obligation of the trustee to exercise prudence is a species of
his duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries. He owes his allegiance to the
beneficiaries first. Other considerations are secondary. The accepted
standard is declared in the famous opinion of the late Mr. Justice (then
Judge) Cardozo in Meinhard v Salmon, 249N.Y458, 1 164 N.E. 545, 62 ALR
1 (1928):
"Many forms of conduct permissible in a workday world for those
acting at arm f s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place.
Not honesty alone, but the punctillio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition
that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the
attitude of the courts or equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of
undivided loyalty by the disintegrating erosion 1 of particular exceptions.
Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level
higher than that trodden by the crowd.TT
We submit if Bowman is not reconsidered, Utah will be the only state of
the Union where a Trustee may, with impunity, use margin, speculate, and thus
destroy the estate he is entrusted with. The petition for rehearing should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD W. CAMPBELL
2650 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
H. DON SHARP
550 24th Street
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Attorneys for Respondents
and Petitioners
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